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Abstract 
 
 As the legal foundation of racial affirmative action in public education erodes, 
alternatives to these policies must be examined where diversity is socially and pedagogically 
valued.  The purpose of this thesis is to determine if race-neutral, socioeconomic status-based 
affirmative action policies can be applied to produce comparable levels of racial/ethnic 
enrollment proportions within schools (versus racial affirmative action).  My study examines the 
Chicago Public Schools’ Admissions Policy for Magnet, Selective Enrollment and Other Options 
For Knowledge Schools and Programs, which applied a SES-based admissions standard to the 
Selective Enrollment High School program in 2011.  Using data on Selective Enrollment High 
Schools and CPS demographic enrollment, this thesis determines the treatment effect of the new 
policy on enrollment proportions through multiple linear regression.  The analysis provides 
empirical evidence that SES-based admissions policies yield statistically significant decreases in 
Black and minority student enrollment proportions, which are 5.8% and 7% lower than 
enrollment under a racial affirmative action admissions policy, respectively.  However, based on 
anecdotal evidence, the CPS policy provides one of the strongest race-neutral affirmative action 
policy formulas available to date, and nonetheless works to ensure the presence of a critical mass 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction: Background, Policy Significance and Specific Aims 
 The national landscape surrounding affirmative action in education has drastically 
changed over the past decade.   Historical policy mainstays protecting diversity are being 
challenged as public school systems react to an idealized post-racist American culture.  Within 
public magnet schools and institutions of higher learning, admissions policies—where relevant—
have begun evolving past racial affirmative action, leaving many minority students with 
narrower avenues to opportunity.  Despite the legal ban on segregation decided in 1954 by 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, undeniable racial and economic segregation exists 
within many urban school districts today, in many cases resigning minority students to 
underperforming neighborhood schools.  In cases where these students have the chance to pursue 
higher quality public education through specialized or magnet schools, affirmative action 
policies can ensure equitable levels of minority student enrollment.  Today, the challenge for 
public schools—primary, secondary, and tertiary—is how to maintain diversity, as race becomes 
an increasingly impermissible admission or school composition factor.   
 In states where integration efforts are voluntary, utilizing race explicitly to determine 
school enrollment is no longer permissible.  In public primary and secondary schools, Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 1 (2007) held that that race could not 
be used as an admissions factor in public schools to combat de facto segregation1 because, 
among other issues: no effort to consider a race-neutral alternative was taken, and the policy did 
not individually consider student assignment based on race.  Justice Anthony Kennedy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 De facto segregation is segregation that voluntarily occurs in practice, but is not ordained by law.  In the case of 
public schools, this means that schools are segregated because of factors like neighborhood composition and self-
segregation.  This is held in contrast to de jure, or “by law,” segregation, which is mandated by law.  School 
composition policies that included de jure segregation have since been remanded, and in the case where these 
segregation policies were found, quota systems or busing policies were generally enforced until the district gained 
unitary status (proved that the harm of the previous discrimination had been corrected).  
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concluded, in his concurring opinion, that race-conscious mechanisms, which do not lead to 
differential treatment or preference to a student based explicitly upon race, would likely be held 
constitutional thereupon (PICS v. Seattle, 2007).  As a result, some public school districts and 
institutions are aiming to capture and ensure diversity with policies that apply designed race-
conscious mechanisms—as opposed to race-based.   
In public primary and secondary schools that have admissions procedures, policies 
concerning diversity (where no prior de jure segregation had been practiced) vary between 
school systems: in some, districts utilize a strict merit-based system, which rarely—if ever— 
produces a critical mass of minority students.  More commonly, these admissions procedures are 
treated most similarly to that of a university—where race is factored in some way.  In higher 
education, the landmark Supreme Court decision, Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke (1978) concluded that, while explicit racial admissions quotas violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, utilizing race as a “plus” factor for minority candidates 
was legitimate and served a compelling interest.  This interest was maintained by the Grutter v. 
Bollinger (2003) decision, which held that race-conscious admissions policies were a justifiable 
means to achieve the education benefits of a diverse student body.  However, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor stated, in the decision: “The Court expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today” (Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 2003, p. 310).   
Only a decade later, racial preference in admissions is already highly contested.  In June 
2013, the Supreme Court remanded Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (2013)—upholding 
the pedagogical and legal foundations of affirmative action, but increasing the standard of 
scrutiny for the use of race as an admissions factor in public education.  Thus, policymakers at 
RACE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND REPRESENTATION: REDEFINING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CHICAGO 10 
the University of Texas at Austin are challenged to prove that their criteria in admission are the 
only way to ensure a diverse student body.  On April 22, 2014, the Supreme Court held that it is 
constitutional for states to ban affirmative action policies outright in Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action with a 6-2 decision (Liptak, 2014).  In 2006, Michigan’s Proposal 2, 
which banned public schools from using race as an admissions factor, was incorporated into the 
state constitution—and Michigan joined Arizona, California, Florida, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, Oklahoma and Washington in the company of states that have instituted bans on 
affirmative action in public institutions or schools.  This landmark decision will change the 
national perspective on affirmative action, and may now affect admissions policies at magnet 
schools, specialized schools, and institutions of higher education across the country.  In response 
to the changing legal climate surrounding existing affirmative action, some proactive public 
school systems have already attempted to implement policy reform that uses non-racial diversity 
measures to ensure the continuation of satisfactory racial balance.   
One such reform, adopted by the Chicago Public Schools in 2010, utilizes a 
socioeconomic status-based variable to achieve racial diversity.  This relatively new policy, fully 
implemented in the 2011-2012 academic year, has attempted to maintain a similar level of 
student body diversity when compared to the previously employed quota system.  Although 
some parents and community members disagree with the design of the new admissions 
standards, the affected schools have remained relatively diverse (Chicago Board of Education 
[CBOE], 2011).   
Twenty-first century judicial decisions and public sentiment have seemingly shortened 
the lifespan of explicit racial affirmative action, but the inarguable inequality of access to high-
quality education, for both low-income and minority students, endures—necessitating policy 
RACE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND REPRESENTATION: REDEFINING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CHICAGO 11 
action.  While arguments for socioeconomic affirmative action have been made for decades, the 
Chicago case study is significant because it exhibits the first deliberate SES-based admissions 
policy in a primary and secondary public school system, which is applied to the city’s selective 
enrollment and magnet schools (Thomas et al., 2011).  Thus, the question remains as to whether 
or not these mechanisms can accurately capture and maintain a socially beneficial and equitable 
level of diversity within public schools.  By analyzing enrollment trends pre- and post-policy 
implementation, this thesis will determine whether this policy ensures comparable, significant 
levels of racial diversity within affected schools.  
The Court’s decisions imply that race-neutral affirmative action policies are possible 
methods to achieve diversity in schools, and I will examine whether or not the Chicago Public 
Schools’ race-neutral admissions policy is as effective as a quota system at producing diversity 
within schools.  First, in this thesis, I will establish the social, legal, and historical framework 
surrounding both modern desegregation and affirmative action policies, from a national 
perspective and in Chicago.  Second, I will explain the Chicago Public Schools’ designed 
socioeconomic status-based admissions policy and relevant variables, and discuss the origins of 
socioeconomic status as a factor in diversity maintenance.  In the subsequent chapter, Chapter 3, 
I will introduce the analyzed data and the regression model through which the policy will be 
evaluated.  In Chapter 4 (Results), I will examine changes in the share of enrollment represented 
by several demographic groups of students at Selective Enrollment High Schools in Chicago, 
before and after the implementation of SES-based admissions standards, to determine the effect 
of the policy on school racial/ethnic composition.  Finally, in the conclusion, I will address 
broader implications and limitations of my findings, and present opportunities for further 
research on socioeconomic affirmative action.   
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
 Desegregation, particularly desegregation education policy, began in 1954 with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), wherein it was decided that 
state-imposed segregation violated students’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection, 
concluding that “[racially] separate educational facilities are inherently unequal” (Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, 1954, p. 495).  Despite the weight of this decision, integration 
progress was slow in states that had historically instituted segregation laws: for example, in 
1965, only 7.5% of Black students in the South attended schools with White students (Levine & 
Havighurst, 1989, p. 309).  In states that had not instituted explicit segregation, increasing urban 
residential segregation led to growing public schooling segregation in many Northern cities.  
This was the case in Chicago, where in 1960, 69% of Black residents lived in communities that 
were at least 95% African-American (“Local Community Fact Book,” 1984). 
It was not for another ten years that two pieces of national legislation—the Civil Rights 
Act (1964) and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965)—would begin nearly a 
decade of widespread desegregation efforts across the country (concentrated in the South), and 
marked the practical beginning of educational racial integration in the segregated South.  The 
Civil Rights Act, which provided injunctive relief against all forms of discrimination, was 
bolstered by the ESEA with respect to school desegregation: states were given financial 
incentive to promote integration, and additional funding was allotted to schools serving low-
income families.  Thus, in the South, integration efforts were more hastily implemented, and 
generally met with little resistance.  As a result, the racial balance within many of these schools 
became consistent with national averages as legal changes, busing, and school board redistricting 
worked to eliminate the “separate but equal” school.  In the North, both civil rights advocates 
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and the courts began taking steps to combat some de facto segregation—in New York and New 
Jersey, courts upheld districts’ decisions to draw school boundary lines in order to produce more 
substantial racial balance.  Comprehensive voluntary integration initiatives passed in some states 
(like Massachusetts), which aimed to eliminate imbalance altogether, and were seen sparingly in 
the 1970s and 1980s in Northern states and urban centers.  In contrast, other districts engaged in 
school district gerrymandering and new, isolating school construction in order to produce levels 
of segregation akin to that seen in pre-Brown southern schools (Levine & Havighurst, 1989).  
Concurrently, institutions that utilized admissions procedures (particularly, in higher 
education) adopted policies of affirmative action as a result of the Civil Rights movement.  In 
1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Executive Order 11246, which compelled 
government contractors to employ affirmative action in their hiring practices, and in subsequent 
years, many colleges and universities adopted similar policies.  At the time, only five percent of 
undergraduate students, two percent of medical students, and one percent of law students were 
Black (“Affirmative Action,” 2013).   
Affirmative action admissions and hiring policies began to be placed under increased 
scrutiny in the late 1970s, where quota policies in cases of voluntary integration and diversity-
seeking were deemed unconstitutional (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978).2  
Further, as the political landscape surrounding the Civil Rights movement began to change as 
equal rights concepts became more widespread—and the social psychology arguments of race 
relations outlined in the 1960s grew outmoded—both desegregation and affirmative action 
policies aimed at improving diversity in public schools were deprioritized (Levine & Havighurst, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Quotas could be legally employed in cases where institutions were found guilty of past, substantial de jure 
segregation; in these cases, a quota was allowed as an alternative policy to correct past injustices by providing more 
equitable access to harmed minority groups.  Such was the case in Chicago in 1980, and had been in many Southern 
school districts during the early stages of integration.   
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1989).  In affirmative action, this meant that the scrutiny applied to minority benefits grew every 
year.  For integration, this meant the de facto segregation that emerged in the North as a result of 
more popular neighborhood school policies kept schools segregated: growing inequity in 
Northern cities offset the comparatively immense progress made in desegregation in the South.  
In the North, where at best racial isolation marginally decreased, or at worst, grew, urban 
residential segregation became the integration challenge of the late twentieth century. 
Urban Segregation and Chicago’s Consent Decree 
 In 1973, a landmark decision in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado defined 
the level of scrutiny to be applied to indirect de facto segregation in Northern cities.  Within the 
context of desegregation, it was the first major decision regarding segregation outside of the 
South, and worked to spur most of the comprehensive integration efforts in major cities that had 
never experienced government-imposed, explicit school segregation, but saw extreme practical 
levels of racial imbalance.  This established a prima facie case of constitutional violations by the 
Denver schools, whereby the board intentionally implemented policies that furthered racial 
segregation within their district.  Although, because of a variety of external, private factors, 
many neighborhood schools may experience some levels of undue racial isolation, it is the legal 
responsibility of the school boards to ameliorate these issues through desegregation and 
integration policies.  In the case of Denver, it was determined that not only did policymakers 
reject resolutions to implement desegregation measures in the affluent Park Hill neighborhood, 
but also actively promoted racial segregation:  
[Through] the construction of a new, relatively small elementary school, Barrett, in the 
middle of the Negro community west of Park Hill, by the gerrymandering of student 
attendance zones, by the use of so-called ‘optional zones,’ and by the excessive use of 
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mobile classroom units, among other things, the respondent School Board had engaged 
over almost a decade after 1960 in an unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial 
segregation with respect to the Park Hill schools (192). 
With respect to public school policy, this case established that school boards bear the burden of 
proving that segregation existing within their districts is not the result of any segregative intent 
(Keyes v. School District No. 1, 1973).  Thus, following this decision, many other districts’ 
policies—across the Northeast and Midwest—became the subject of lower-court lawsuits, which 
often led to decades of mandated, broad desegregation initiatives.  In Denver, the result was 21 
years of mandatory busing, in which about a quarter of public school students were forcibly 
bused to schools throughout the city in order to achieve district-wide racial balance (Brooke, 
1995).   
 The court decrees were often met with White flight and public discord.  In 1968, before 
the first lawsuit was brought against the Denver School District, almost 64,000 White students 
attended public schools in the city.  In 1975, when the policies mandated by the Supreme Court 
decision were enforced, 7,000 fewer White students were enrolled.  In violent protest, arsonists 
set fire to nearly one-third of the buses to be used for desegregation, and the home of Wilfred 
Keyes (the plaintiff in the landmark case) was pipe bombed.  Parents, particularly middle class, 
White parents, protested the busing policy vehemently (as they had played a large role in 
ensuring that desegregation resolutions were not passed in the late 1960s), and when 
desegregation continued, they responded by removing their children from the Denver Public 
Schools.  Thousands of White families moved to the suburbs or enrolled their children in private 
schools as a direct result of this policy change: in 1970, 89% of Denver’s population was White.  
But by 1990, it had shrunk to 72.1%, and is currently less than 68%.  In the 1960s, Denver’s 
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population was growing at a rate of about 18.8%.  In the 1970s, this rate dropped to 4.2%, and in 
the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, the urban population decreased by 4.3 and 5%.  While these 
population trends are not uniquely explained by the school policy, it was one of the largest 
contributing factors to Denver’s trend of White flight in the late twentieth century.  By 1995, 
when the desegregation busing policy was vacated, White enrollment in Denver Public Schools 
had dropped over 71%.  Even with desegregation busing, some schools still had around 90% 
minority enrollment, simply because there were not enough White students in the school system 
to integrate (Brooke, 1995).  White flight was one of the worst—and most counterproductive—
effects of Northern integration policies.  In the end, Denver ended its desegregation policy in part 
because of the growing lack of White students within the school district.   
 Certainly, many White middle class families were leaving large cities in droves in the 
1970s and 1980s: while desegregation policies did factor into many of these decisions, school 
policies were not wholly responsible for White flight—as neighborhood decline, urban 
infrastructure, and sprawl contributed to the middle class suburban shift.  In fact, middle class 
Black families who lived in working class neighborhoods relocated during this time period as 
well, in an effort to remove their children from schools and neighborhoods plagued with poverty, 
crime and violence (Wolman, 1976).  However, the phenomenon of White flight was often, if not 
always, taken into account when designing desegregation policy—as the presence of White 
families in a district was a key ingredient in the integration mix.  Thus, most late desegregation 
policies, crafted after decades of observed urban White flight, were conscientious of White 
residents, and featured more voluntary, and less invasive, integration measures (Levine, 1989).  
This was the case in Chicago in 1980, where a federal suit resulted in a desegregation decree that 
was implemented through policies of compensatory funding for failing majority-minority 
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schools, voluntary busing, and magnet school construction—which, ultimately, had marginal 
effects on overall school integration or quality.  Measurable desegregation in Chicago, since the 
1960s, has only been seen in one program: magnet schools. 
 The story of segregation and desegregation in Chicago actually begins much earlier than 
the Keyes decision or Chicago’s consent decree—in 1965, the Chicago Public Schools were the 
first Northern recipients of a Civil Rights Act Title VI complaint, which alleged that integration 
efforts were hindered by school boundary gerrymandering, inadequate transfer plans, extreme 
school quality gaps, and explicit segregation at some Chicago schools.  As a result, the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now defunct) withheld $32 million in ESEA 
funding.  However, the clout of the Chicago political machine proved stronger than the justified 
complaint—after a short meeting between Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley and President 
Lyndon B. Johnson, the funds were released to the CPS (Danns, 2011). 
 Over the next decade-and-a-half, minor desegregation efforts were made in response to 
public and institutional pressure.  Using the argument of White flight prevention (although it 
would later be determined that in Chicago, desegregation did not as significantly influence White 
flight compared to other cities like Denver), voluntary desegregation busing was instituted in 
some neighborhoods: and in a public school system of over 550,000, at most 600 Black students 
were integrated into White schools through this limited busing system.  In the early 1970s, under 
orders from the Illinois state government, the CPS developed a more comprehensive 
desegregation plan that relied more heavily on voluntary busing and magnet schools.  Busing, 
which was unpopular in many White as well as Black communities, failed to provide any 
substantial measure of desegregation in Chicago.  The magnet school program, another product 
of this wave of reforms, was also small in scale.  The first magnet school (later Selective 
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Enrollment), Whitney M. Young High School, opened in 1975, and a handful of other magnet 
elementary and high schools sprung up across the city.  However, by the end of the decade, only 
about 5% of Chicago schools were participating in desegregation by busing, and worse than 89% 
of minority students attended segregated schools (Danns, 2011; Bogira, 1988).  While this level 
of segregation was not necessarily uncommon in Northern urban school districts, in the case of 
Chicago, it was systematic.    
 Finally, after over fifteen years of segregation violations, the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare charged the CPS with seven violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act, alleging that the district engaged in policies that: 
(1) Created attendance boundaries and structures which promoted racial segregation; (2) 
maintained racially segregated branch schools; (3) maintained segregation through 
permanent or temporary facilities to relieve overcrowding; (4) maintained crowded, 
inferior schools in such a way to identify them for Black students; (5) assigned teachers 
and staff to match the race of the students at those schools; (6) used a permissive transfer 
policy which allowed White students to transfer out of schools in which they were the 
minority; and (7) associated segregated schools with segregated housing projects (Danns, 
2011).   
When the complaint was addressed in federal court, CPS was charged with purposefully 
segregating minority and White students, and agreed to remedy the injustices with a 
comprehensive desegregation plan.  The first concession made, however, was that not all 
students could be desegregated: with White enrollment around 17% when the policies were 
being drafted, there simply were not enough Whites within the district to provide racial balance 
at all of the schools (Danns, 2011).  Had initial complaints against Chicago been prosecuted—in 
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1965, when half of CPS students were White—true integration could have been reasonably 
achieved.  White families had been steadily leaving the city and public school system since the 
1950s: White enrollment comprised 62% of total enrollment in 1950, but by 1987, that 
proportion had dropped to only 14% of the CPS population.  Appendix A provides information 
on CPS demographic enrollment trends for select, benchmarking years between 1950-2010.  By 
the time desegregation was legally mandated in Chicago in 1980, minority students comprised 
over 80% of the enrollees (Bogira, 1988).  
After minor consideration of a highly unpopular interdistrict transfer program (with 
wealthy, White suburban districts), the board agreed upon a desegregation plan that would 
provide increased access to more magnet schools, voluntary transfers for thousands of minority 
students,3 and compensatory programs and funding for segregated, failing schools.  Of all of 
these policies, only the magnet program saw any accomplishment in terms of desegregation—in 
fact, the schools, particularly the Selective Enrollment schools, became the crown jewels of the 
otherwise inequitable, failing CPS system.  Not only were most of these schools some of the 
strongest performing academically, but most provided dynamic, integrated environments for 
students from all over the city. 
These specialized programs, however, disproportionately benefitted White students and 
absorbed a hefty amount of resources relative to the other larger mandated desegregation 
programs.  The benefit, however, was necessary for the provision of desegregation: while Whites 
composed around 15% of the CPS population, at that time more than 15% non-minority students 
were needed at each magnet to provide a desegregated environment relative to the urban 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is notable that this aspect of desegregation was relatively successful; by 1986, nearly all (save two) of the 
formerly all-White public schools were reduced to under 70% White through the busing of Black and Hispanic 
students.  However, these desegregation efforts were one-way: nearly all of the all-minority schools remained 
segregated, and remain so today (Danns, 2011).  
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population.  By the late 1980s, double the amount of Whites were enrolled in magnet schools as 
were enrolled in neighborhood public schools.  The magnet program, adequately designed to 
keep White families in the Chicago Public Schools, actually improved the White student public 
school experience far more than it did for minorities—with the best Selective Enrollment schools 
(the highest performing level of magnet schools) enrolling nearly 40% White student bodies.  
Further, not including transportation costs, the CPS spent over double the amount, per pupil, on 
magnet school students than it spent on compensatory programs at racially isolated schools 
(Bogira, 1988).  Understanding that these top-performing, high-resource schools would attract 
proportionally more White students than non-White, to protect access for the disadvantaged 
minority, quota policies were established as a part of 1980 Consent Decree, which mandated that 
all magnet schools enroll 65-85% minority students, at minimum.  By combining this corrective 
quota with academic programs to attract White students, the magnet schools actually worked to 
create diverse learning environments, which have persisted (Bogira, 1988).  However, without 
the quota system, the schools would have likely become segregated majority-White 
institutions—as seen in other selective magnet systems, like New York’s Specialized Schools 
(NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 2012).   
In 2009, when the consent decree was vacated as a result of longstanding compliance, the 
CPS made a concerted effort to maintain the diversity that was present at most of its selective 
schools.  The quota system, which was only legal to rectify de jure segregation outlined by the 
consent decree, was no longer an option.  In 2010, the school district piloted a new admissions 
policy, which factored neighborhood socioeconomic status instead of race or ethnicity.  
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The Chicago Public Schools’ Socioeconomic Status-Based Admissions Policy 
The Blue Ribbon Committee, a task force appointed by the Chicago Public Schools, 
began to draft a new admissions policy for Chicago’s nine Selective Enrollment public high 
schools in 2009.4  CPS had previously ensured diversity in its admissions-based schools via a 
consent decree-mandated racial quota since 1980.  This decree, ordered as a result of 
unconstitutional segregation policies devised to limit “White flight,” was terminated and vacated 
on September 24, 2009, as CPS had demonstrated long-standing compliance (United States of 
America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2009).  However, following PICS v. 
Seattle (2007), the race-factored policy outlined by the decree was no longer a permissible 
method of maintaining diversity voluntarily.5  Thus, CPS was challenged to determine a new 
policy that would maintain a comparable level of student body diversity within its admissions-
based schools. 
As a caveat, neighborhood schools generally see diversity reflective of the local school 
district population, as a result of numerous anti-desegregation judicial decisions in the 1990s, 
which empowered de facto segregation following the expiration or vacation of court-mandated 
desegregation, as in Freeman v. Pitts (1992).  Consequently, the Chicago Public Schools 
system—when examined altogether—is actually one of the most segregated metropolitan school 
systems in the country.  In terms of community racial variation and isolation, as measured by the 
percentage of students who would have to change schools to achieve system-wide, level racial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Today, Chicago Public Schools operates ten Selective Enrollment schools, including South Shore International 
College Prep, which opened in 2011.  The final admissions policy applied to a total of ten (10) schools when it was 
accepted on August 24, 2011.   
5 In accordance with PICS v. Seattle, using race as an explicit factor in admission or composition is permissible 
when it is utilized to correct previously instituted segregation.  Because the consent decree was mandated as a result 
of unconstitutional segregation policy, race as an admission and school composition factor was permitted.  When the 
decree was vacated, the Court determined that CPS faithfully carried out desegregation policy and that the harms of 
past discrimination had been ameliorated.  Thus, race alone could no longer be considered a compelling factor in 
determining school composition.   
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distribution (dissimilarity index), Chicago ranks worst in four out of six dissimilarity categories, 
when comparing the five most segregated metropolitan areas nationally.  Appendix B 
summarizes these dissimilarity indices.  Further, in Chicago, 71.8% of all Black students attend 
over 90% minority schools, and almost half attend over 99% minority schools (Orfield, Kucsera, 
& Siegel-Hawley, 2012, p. 60).  To put this into perspective, in the 1960s, this figure was about 
65% nationally (Coleman, 1966, p. 3).  And while this high level of segregation was largely 
ignored in the twenty-first century policy sphere—as national desegregation policy is no longer 
enforced in most school districts—more equitable admissions policies for the Selective 
Enrollment and magnet schools were designed to allow equal access to high quality education for 
students regardless of racial or socioeconomic background.  Piloted in 2010 and implemented the 
following academic year, the new policy took into account student socioeconomic status as a 
categorical factor in admissions decisions (CBOE, 2011).  
 Under the Admissions Policy for Magnet, Selective Enrollment and Other Options For 
Knowledge Schools and Programs, admission to each of the current ten Selective Enrollment 
High Schools6 is determined by two factors: composite admissions score and socioeconomic tier 
(CBOE, 2011).  
Admissions Score Calculation 
The composite admissions score is a numerical point value calculated based on three 
equally-weighted factors: high school entrance exam score, seventh grade reading and math 
standardized test scores, and seventh grade academic marks (in reading, math, science, and social 
studies).  Each of these sections is weighted equally with 300 points—wherein perfect (99th 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Chicago Public Schools Selective Enrollment High Schools are: Robert Lindblom Math & Science Academy, 
William Jones College Preparatory High School, Walter Payton College Preparatory High School, George 
Westinghouse High School, Albert G. Lane Technical High School, Gwendolyn Brooks College Preparatory 
Academy High School, Northside College Preparatory High School, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Preparatory High 
School, Whitney M. Young Magnet High School, and South Shore International High School.	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percentile) Selective Enrollment High School admissions exam scores, perfect standardized test 
scores (the Illinois State Achievement Test is most commonly used), and straight “A”s garner a 
maximum score of 900 (CBOE, 2011).  Before the new admissions policy was instituted, 
admission to these Selective Enrollment schools was based solely on composite admissions 
scores and race, with composition ratios of at most 35% White and at least 65% non-White 
(United States of America v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2009).  
Socioeconomic Tier Calculation   
The socioeconomic tier system, which attempts to ensure equality of access to students of 
all backgrounds, was introduced as an additional factor in admission with the new policy 
(replacing quotas).  In this system, students are assigned to a tier—1 through 4—based upon 
where they live in the city; specifically, their census tract.  CPS annually assigns tiers to each of 
the city’s tracts based upon a percentile ranking of six neighborhood factors: median family 
income, percentage of home ownership, percentage of single-parent households, percentage of 
the population that is English-speaking, highest level of adult educational attainment (a 
structured variable), and local school performance (a structured variable).  Based upon this data, 
the tracts are split into four equal, ranked groups— the tiers—with Tier 1 representing lowest 
socioeconomic tracts and Tier 4 representing the highest (Thomas et al., 2011).  
 The socioeconomic (SES) score is calculated, per tier, as follows:  
 
SES Score = Percentile Median Income                        (1) 
+ Percentile Home Ownership  
+ Percentile Single-Parent Family 
+ Percentile Non-English Speaking 
  + Percentile Education Score 
+ Percentile Local School Performance 
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Where percentile median income, home ownership, single-parent family, and non-English 
speaking data are taken directly from the Census (or estimates), and both education score and 
school performance are structured variables utilizing Census and test score data, respectively 
(Thomas et al., 2011).   
The education score is calculated based on tract adult educational attainment as listed on 
the Census, with categories: less than high school diploma, high school diploma, some college, 
Bachelor’s Degree, Advanced Degree.  Each category is weighted to reflect the implicit positive 
socioeconomic effects associated with higher community education levels.  The score is 
calculated based on the equation: 
 
Education Score = 0.2 * (% Less than High School Diploma)                        (2) 
     + 0.4 * (% High School Diploma) 
     + 0.6 * (% Some College) 
     + 0.8 * (% Bachelor’s Degree) 
     + 1.0 * (% Advanced Degree) 
 
Where the lowest possible score is 0.20 (no adults in the tract have completed high school) and 
the highest is 1.0 (all adults have completed an advanced degree).  These scores are then ranked 
(assigned a percentile) and tabulated in the SES score figure (Open City, 2013). 
The school performance variable, which was incorporated in 2011 after the pilot program 
yielded significantly decreased Black enrollment, takes into account local school quality by 
examining public school composite test scores, based on the Illinois Standard Achievement Test 
(ISAT).  This score variable is simply the weighted average of the ISAT performance of that 
neighborhood: for any school within a census tract, composite ISAT scores are averaged across 
all students tested (grades 3-8) and multiplied by the proportion of students served by the school 
with respect to total tract public school enrollment.  These scores are then summed for each 
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elementary school in the census tract to determine the local school performance variable.  The 
performance variable can be summarized by the equation: 
 
School Performance = 𝑥 !"!!!"  !"#$%%&'"(!!"#$%  !"#$%%&'"( ∗  Composite ISAT Scoren            (3)  
 
Local school performance scores are then assigned percentiles, which are utilized in the final 
SES score calculation.   
Once the percentiles for all six factors of the SES score are calculated, they are summed 
for each census tract and rank-ordered.  The tiers are then determined by grouping the 25% 
lowest into Tier 1, the next lowest 25% into Tier 2, and so on.  There are typically marked 
differences across all categories between tiers: for example, in the pilot year (2010), the median 
income in a Tier 4 neighborhood was $76,829, compared to $30,791 in Tier 1 (Policy briefing 
[PowerPoint slides], 2011).   
Selective Enrollment Admissions Structure 
Student admission into a Selective Enrollment High School is then determined by taking 
into account both composite admissions score and tier.  Under the current policy, 30% of the 
seats in Selective Enrollment schools are reserved for the students who have the highest 
composite scores—regardless of socioeconomic status.  The remaining 70% of seats are divided 
evenly between each of the four tiers—with the top students from each tier, ranked by individual 
composite admissions score, earning acceptance to their choice of school (Thomas et al., 2011).    
These measures were designed to create a minority/non-minority mix that was similar to 
that which was produced under a quota system in a race-neutral way, even though some aspects 
of the neighborhood tier factors were evidently targeted at specific demographic groups.  
Although this policy change was met with some criticism—most notably from families in 
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wealthier neighborhoods whose children are now less likely to be admitted under the SES 
system—socioeconomic affirmative action is viewed as an increasingly viable alternative to 
traditional, race-based affirmative action.  However, the SES-based policy’s limitations and 
novelty in modern practice preclude any recommendation for this change without further 
analysis.  Although other SES-based affirmative action policies have been practiced in some 
institutions throughout the country, their effectiveness is neither conclusive nor convincing.  
The goal of the new policy was to ensure that students from all socioeconomic 
backgrounds had equal access to Selective Enrollment High Schools, while also working to 
maintain diversity within the schools.  Historically, the best Selective Enrollment High Schools 
saw skewed socioeconomic distributions—favoring higher income students—but also diverse 
student bodies, in accordance with the consent decree.  The Blue Ribbon Committee was thus 
tasked with both expanding access and maintaining diversity without any explicit race factor—
ultimately designing one of the first high school socioeconomic status-based admissions policies 
in the country. 
 The Blue Ribbon Committee designed the SES-based admissions policy in a race-neutral 
way, while removing some bias against minority students—predicted by a strict socioeconomic 
admissions policy— by introducing two additional variables, outside of SES indicators, to the 
tier system: percentile non-English speaking and percentile local school performance.  The 
percentile non-English speaking factor directly targets Hispanic students, whose communities 
(tracts on the West Side of the city) are the highest non-English speaking percentile in the city.  
Without this factor, Hispanic admission to Selective Enrollment High Schools would have fallen 
significantly.  The local school performance variable was added after the pilot year of the 
admissions program as a sixth factor when a marked drop in Black Selective Enrollment 
RACE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND REPRESENTATION: REDEFINING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CHICAGO 27 
admission was observed.  Because of residential segregation, community poverty, and violence, 
schools within predominantly Black communities (tracts) are the worst performing in the city.  
Thus, when school quality was taken into account, Black enrollment rose because the SES 
variable percentile for all of these predominantly Black, low-income communities dropped—
making it less competitive for these students to gain admission (Thomas et al., 2011).  The 
question remains, however, as to how well these variables are able to proxy race and maintain 
comparable student body composition post-racial affirmative action policy.  Further, can this 
designed socioeconomic tier system be applied to other schools’ and districts’ policies—where 
Fisher v. Texas and Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action threaten race-factored 
admissions policies and affirmative action altogether? 
The Origins of Socioeconomic Affirmative Action 
Since racial affirmative action policy was introduced during Civil Rights era, popular 
opinion in the United States regarding affirmative action—once touted a guarantor of equity—
has shifted dramatically.  In a national survey conducted by Gallup, only 28% of American 
adults stated that they felt race should be taken into account in college admissions decisions, and 
policy in many states and school districts reflects this sentiment.  Further, about two-thirds of 
respondents believed that applicants should be evaluated based solely on merit.  While opinions 
on the importance of affirmative action vary by racial group (with 22% of Whites favoring racial 
affirmative action, versus 48% and 31% of Black and Hispanic respondents, respectively), less 
than half of all minority groups believe that race should be a considered factor (2013).  
Conversely, the importance of diversity in schools is not contested.  However, both 
example and research illustrate that merit-based admissions systems, unaccompanied, cannot 
produce diverse student bodies: in either colleges or high schools.  After California instituted its 
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ban on racial affirmative action in 1996 (Proposition 209), minority enrollment dropped 
drastically at the state’s top colleges: after UCLA implemented this policy in 1998, by 2006, 
only about 2% of the entering first-year class was Black (Hayasaki, 2006).  A study conducted 
by Anthony Carnevale and Stephen J. Rose found that if performance (as measured by grades 
and test scores) were the sole basis of student admission, only 4% of the seats at the top 146 
colleges in the U.S. would be occupied by Black and Latino students (2004).  In New York 
City’s Specialized High Schools, where admission is determined only by rank-order entrance 
exam performance, only 5% of Black and 6.7% of Latino students who applied were offered 
admission into any of the Specialized High Schools (versus almost 31% and 35% acceptance 
rates for White and Asian students, respectively), although nearly 70% of all public school 
students in New York City are minorities.  At Stuyvesant High School, the most selective 
program of the Specialized High Schools, only 19 Black applicants were offered seats in a class 
of 967 students (NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 2012).  Meritocratic admissions 
policies do little to ensure equality of access for minority students.  Thus, it is imperative that 
some form of affirmative action is taken where diversity is considered valuable.   
  Even Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action (2014), which constitutionally 
sustains racial affirmative action bans, holds that diversity is a compelling state interest.  The 
question, rather, concerns the consideration of race-neutral alternatives to achieve this end: for 
example, whether or not socioeconomic affirmative action could protect racial diversity within 
schools as attempted by the Chicago Public Schools.   
 The important role of socioeconomic status in affirmative action and classroom 
composition has been considered since the James Samuel Coleman’s Equality of Educational 
Opportunity in 1966.  More commonly known as the Coleman Report, the study of over 600,000 
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students at 4,000 schools across the United States found that when it comes to educational 
outcomes, what is “put into” schools is less important that who is enrolled.  The landmark study 
determined that school characteristics and inputs—like funding, facilities, resources and school 
day length—had no determinate positive impact on student achievement and attainment, as 
measured by academic performance and graduation rates.  Coleman found, instead, that the 
social class was the only accurate predictor of academic success: socioeconomically 
disadvantaged students consistently achieved lower scores and levels of attainment then their 
middle- and upper-middle class peers.  Summarizing his findings, Coleman (1966) reported: 
Taking all these results together, one implication stands out above all.  That schools bring 
little influence to bear on a child’s achievement that is independent of his background and 
general social context; and that this very lack of an independent effect means that the 
inequalities imposed on children by their home, neighborhood, and peer environment are 
carried along to become the inequalities with which they confront adult life at the end of 
school.  For equality of educational opportunity through the schools must imply a strong 
effect of schools that is independent of the child's immediate social environment, and that 
strong independent effect is not present in American schools (325). 
Thus, while Coleman made no specific policy recommendations within his Report, the 
implication—that diverse student body composition was the key to equality of educational 
opportunity—was clear.  By linking social capital and values with achievement, Coleman 
identified the importance of peer effects on outcomes for disadvantaged students.  When 
disadvantaged students are placed in classrooms with majority middle- and upper-middle class 
students, they report a marked improvement in educational outcomes, while advantaged students 
experience no negative effect: education was not, and is not, a zero-sum game.  The achievement 
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gap—which has nonetheless persisted into the twenty-first century—could be addressed by 
creating diverse classrooms.  These discoveries subsequently changed the modern understanding 
of educational equality and social reproduction.  If schools were to provide equal opportunity for 
all students, integration was vital (Coleman, 1966).  Accordingly, this study was the basis of 
many of the desegregation busing policies that were decreed during the latter half of the 20th 
century.  
 The relationship between social class and race was perhaps more definite during the early 
years of desegregation, as defined by Coleman and his contemporaries, than it is in the twenty-
first century.  This connection, combined with the collective racial equality movement, shaped 
the quota-based busing systems that defined public education policy during the 1970s and 1980s.  
These widespread desegregation policies—which, when decreed, were aimed at correcting past 
discriminations, rather than providing for equality of opportunity explicitly—were set to expire 
once each offending school district had achieved unitary status; when the magnitude of the 
original harm for the affected minority groups had been sufficiently amended.  Consequently, 
many of these policies expired or were vacated after the probationary period ended, and as a 
result, de facto segregation within school systems and districts—based upon residential 
segregation of minority and low-income families—reemerged.  As desegregation policies have 
begun to disappear from public educational institutions, dissimilarity index scores comparable to 
the Civil Rights-era have become commonplace (Orfield, Kucsera & Siegel-Hawley, 2012).  
Concurrently, the judicial scrutiny applied to desegregation policies that are race-centric has 
become narrower.  Thus, the policy question of how to correct this dissimilarity—given the 
understanding of the importance of peer effects—becomes increasingly difficult.  Simply put, the 
easiest solution to correct this imbalance is to incorporate socioeconomic status into affirmative 
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action policy, aiming to influence school composition through a legal—and effectual—social 
categorical variable.  
 The socioeconomic-peer effects theory demonstrated by Coleman in 1966 has been 
revalidated and substantiated by other scholars (Jencks, 1972; Wilson, 1969), but incorporating a 
standalone socioeconomic variable-based cannot equitably become policy because it 
systematically favors White applicants.  Although Black and Hispanic students are 
disproportionately overrepresented within the low-income social tiers, poor Whites still vastly 
outnumber these Black and Hispanic students (Carnevale & Rose, 2004).  Additionally, low-
income White students still perform markedly better than their minority peers: of the highest-
performing low-income students (90th percentile test scores), only 17.3% were Black or Hispanic 
(Kane, 1998). 
A comparison of Black and White low-income students based on data provided by the 
College Board, which administers the SAT, found an 80 to 100 point gap in math and verbal test 
scores between these two groups—thus, White low-income students, who outnumber Black low-
income students 5:2, would be favored under strict socioeconomic affirmative action (Slater, 
1995).  Research on student body composition at the University of California at Berkley 
concluded that current if racial affirmative action policies were replaced by socioeconomic 
affirmative action, Black enrollment would drop by 62% and White enrollment would increase 
by as much as 25% (Slater, 1995).  Another simulation, which examined elite colleges and 
universities, found that within the larger pool of all low-SES students, qualified (based on a test 
score cutoff, academic marks, teacher recommendations, and leadership experience) Black and 
Hispanic students would represent only 4% and 5.8% of the total seats reserved for low-income 
students based on socioeconomic affirmative action—compared to 6% of seats under traditional 
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affirmative action policy (Carnevale & Rose, 2004).  Thus, socioeconomic status cannot be used 
as a sole variable when developing innovative affirmative action admissions policies, as the 
results would be unduly biased against minority students.   
Select university programs have integrated multi-faceted socioeconomic variables into 
admissions considerations in the face of affirmative action bans.  When California instituted its 
ban in racial affirmative action in 1996, many state institutions struggled to maintain diversity.  
As a result, the UCLA law school implemented a trial run of a socioeconomic-based admissions 
policy in 1997 in order to maintain some level of diversity, factoring student-level demographic 
data for each of the nearly 4,000 applicants on: parental education, parental income, parental net 
worth, single-parent households in neighborhood, families on welfare in neighborhood, and 
young adults who are high school dropouts in neighborhood.  After collecting this data, the 
admissions committee calculated the mean and standard deviation for each of these categories 
based on the top 1,000 applicants (based on assigned academic merit scores from the committee).  
For low-SES students whose admissions profiles were above a minimum academic threshold, a 
point “boost” in overall admissions scores was granted—and thus chances of acceptance for 
disadvantaged students.  Under this policy, roughly 30% of admitted students received this boost, 
while 70% were accepted based on merit alone.  This policy, however, was never able to achieve 
the same level of diversity as the race-factored admissions policy, although the UCLA School of 
Law saw higher minority enrollment than Boalt Hall (UC – Berkeley Law), which took neither 
racial nor socioeconomic affirmative action measures.  The UCLA case, however, provides 
evidence that socioeconomic status-based admissions policies are feasible and do protect 
diversity to a degree—although these policies alone cannot replace explicit race-conscious 
admissions policies as a means to ensure adequate racial balance (Sander, 1998).  Thus, 
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socioeconomic diversity can only serve as one piece of a more complex affirmative action policy 
that assumes the ethical and pedagogical responsibility of a racially diverse student body.  In the 
case of the Chicago Public Schools, where a more complex admissions model is introduced, is 
the Selective Enrollment High Schools’ race-neutral, socioeconomic status-based affirmative 
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Chapter 3. Research Design: Data and Methods 
As alternatives to racial affirmative action are considered nationally, I will evaluate the 
efficacy of the Chicago Public Schools’ new socioeconomic status-based admissions policy as a 
solution to maintain minority representation.  Ultimately, this thesis will address two questions: 
1. Does the SES-based affirmative action policy have an effect on demographic group 
enrollment, relative to racial affirmative action (i.e., quota system)? 
2. How can other school systems and institutions adapt this admissions model to satisfy 
diversity as race-based policies are placed under increased scrutiny? 
The overarching question of this thesis is whether or not the Chicago Public Schools’ admissions 
model can be applied comprehensively or in part to produce an admissible level of diversity.  
Elements of the socioeconomic variables presented in the tier system may not necessarily 
provide the same predictive racial proxies for public school systems (i.e., selective magnet 
elementary and high schools, residentially segregated districts, universities, professional schools) 
across the country: as the importance of factors outside of pure socioeconomic statistics in 
ensuring diverse student body composition have been enumerated, the analysis will determine if 
the combination and weighting of SES factors with race proxies (percent English-speaking, local 
school quality) is viable for CPS, and subsequently relatable nationally.  Thus, the first and most 
important question is whether or not the socioeconomic tier system employed by CPS ensures a 
comparable level of racial diversity.  To answer this question, I apply linear regression analysis 
to determine the impact of a socioeconomic status-based system treatment effect on minority and 
racial group enrollments at Selective Enrollment High Schools in Chicago.   
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Data and Data Collection 
 Data from various actors surrounding the operations of the Selective Enrollment High 
School (SEHS) program was sourced to analyze the impact of the socioeconomic status-based 
admissions policy on racial and ethnic group enrollment.  In addition to enrollment counts and 
proportions, which are of key interest, CPS demographic enrollment data is also examined as a 
control variable in the regression.  All demographic count data collected is ratio level.  
SEHS Enrollment Data 
The enrollment data utilized in this analysis comes directly from the Illinois State Board 
of Education (ISBE), which monitors matriculation to the Selective Enrollment and other public 
school programs in the City of Chicago.  This information includes school-level demographic 
data concerning race and ethnicity, among many other measures (for example: percent free and 
reduced-lunch, school locations, principal information, student standardized test scores, etc.).  
For the purposes of this study, I examined Fall 2006-2013 Grade 9 demographic enrollment 
totals per school.  Data from eight schools: Gwendolyn Brooks College Preparatory High 
School, Jones College Preparatory High School, King College Preparatory High School, Lane 
Technical High School, Lindblom Math and Science Academy, Northside College Preparatory 
High School, Walter Payton College Preparatory High School, and Whitney Young Magnet High 
School, were utilized to analyze school- and SEHS-level demographic shifts as a result of the 
new admissions policy.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Although there are ten total Selective Enrollment High Schools, the remaining two schools—Westinghouse High 
School and South Shore International High School—were established within the last two years, and thus do not have 
enough data points for any pre- and post-policy comparison. 
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The SEHS Grade 9 enrollment data for each school are coded: White, Black, Hispanic, 
Asian8 and Minority.  The fifth group, Minority, is generated as the sum of Black, Hispanic and 
Asian enrollment in a given year.  I will not examine trends in multiracial or Native American 
enrollment, as these categories were inconsistently reported year-to-year.  Appendix C illustrates 
total Grade 9 demographic group enrollment proportions and counts, per year, for each Selective 
Enrollment High School included in the study.  
CPS Enrollment Data 
The Chicago Public Schools has publicly reported annual data on student demographics 
since 1999.  These global trends in system enrollment, enumerated in Appendix A, illustrate 
shifting demographic shares within CPS overall (as Hispanic enrollment rises and Black 
enrollment drops), of which SEHS enrollments are a small part.  This is especially important as 
trends in national minority populations indicate that the proportion of minority students in public 
schools (particularly the Hispanic population), especially in urban areas, will increase 
substantially into 2025 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2010).  Thus, annual Grade 9 
demographic enrollment proportions for CPS are used to control for global student population 
trends across all Chicago Public Schools.  The CPS Grade 9 enrollment data are coded: White, 
Black, Hispanic, Asian and Minority (similarly).  Appendix D illustrates total Grade 9 
demographic group enrollment counts, per year, for the Chicago Public Schools. 
Empirical Method: Linear Regression 
 The Blue Ribbon Committee, in design of the 2011 Admissions Policy for Magnet, 
Selective Enrollment and Other Options For Knowledge Schools and Programs, put forth as a 
priority sustaining diversity in the Chicago Public Schools’ Selective Enrollment High Schools.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 From Fall 2010-2013, ISBE reporting of Asian enrollment split into three categories: Asian, Asian/Pacific Islander 
and Hawaiian/Pacific Islander.  These three categories are combined into one group, Asian, in this analysis, which is 
consistent with the reporting of Asian enrollment from Fall 2006-2009. 
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However, the legal environment surrounding voluntary racial affirmative action in public schools 
was not supportive of the historically effective quota system.  Under these circumstances, the 
committee crafted a policy that aimed to produce race-neutral diversity through a devised 
socioeconomic status tiered system (SES admissions policy).  A regression model can estimate 
the effect of this new policy on demographic enrollment proportions for each group when 
compared to the baseline proportions produced by the vacated quota policy, relating the 
proportions from each cohort.9  Demographic enrollment proportions for each coded group 
(White, Black, Hispanic, Asian and Minority) are derived from the total enrollment counts.10  In 
my analysis, the treatment is defined as whether or not the SES admissions policy was in effect 
in year t, and is described by a binary variable, Treatst = {0,1}, where Treatst takes on a value of 
1 where school s was operating the SES policy in year t, and 0 otherwise.  The treatment 
coefficient, β1, will indicate the effect of the SES admissions policy on demographic enrollment.  
β1 can also be interpreted as the difference in demographic enrollment proportion for a specific 
demographic group, Y, between SES and quota admissions policies.  The outcome of interest, Yst, 
is the proportion of incoming Grade 9 enrollees of a particular race or ethnicity (e.g., White, 
Black, Hispanic) at a Selective Enrollment High School, s, in year t.  Thus, this model will 
answer the question: is demographic enrollment affected by the new SES admissions policy?  
The model is summarized by the equation:   
 
           Yst = β0 + β1Treatst + β2t + σs + εst            (4) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Where the cohorts are split based upon admissions policy type (quota, SES).  Practically, the two groups will 
constitute data from each of the eight schools in fall enrollment years 2006-2010 and 2011-2013 correspondingly.  
10 Note that these proportions will not sum to 1 as Native American, multiracial, other, and non-reporting groups are 
not included in the analysis.  
RACE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND REPRESENTATION: REDEFINING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CHICAGO 38 
Where t is a linear trend and σs represents school fixed effects (i.e., a dummy variable for each 
school).  In all regressions, the error term, εst, is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean 
of 0.  To develop a more robust model, school-specific time trends were added to account for 
variation in enrollment trends over time unique to each school, where (σs * t) captures school-
specific linear time trends, giving: 
 
        Yst = β0 + β1Treatst + (σs * t) + σs + εst           (5) 
 
Finally, the most robust regression model tested is given by the equation:  
      
Yst = β0 + β1Treatst + (σs * t) + σs + β3ρt + εst           (6) 
 
Where the control variable, ρt, is added to the regression to capture trends in the average 
demographic enrollment proportion of all Grade 9 students entering any CPS high school in year 
t.  This variable controls for systemic demographic enrollment changes (whereby, for example, 
increases or decreases in CPS Grade 9 demographic proportions could partially explain matching 
SEHS trends), isolating the composition effect of the treatment on the entering SEHS class.   
The aforementioned regression models are estimated separately for each racial/ethnic 
group—White, Black, Hispanic, Asian and Minority—to determine the effect of the 
socioeconomic status-based admissions policy on each group’s SEHS representation.  The 
significance and relative magnitude of the treatment coefficient will determine if the new policy 
influenced enrollment outcomes for the studied demographics.  The data used in all regressions 
come from ISBE and CPS counts and proportions for Fall 2006-2013 Grade 9 enrollment. 
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Limitations of Data 
Sample Size 
Given the relative novelty of the socioeconomic status-based admissions policy, the 
analysis is limited to only three years of post-implementation data.  As only four years of pre-
policy data are analyzed (to control for exogenous historical effects), the sample size for each 
regression is to N = 56 (school-by-year observations).  Following the regression framework 
outlined, a more compelling test can be explored with a larger sample size in subsequent years. 
Application Trends 
 The 2010 SEHS admissions policy change was highly publicized when it was 
implemented, and influenced many families’ and students’ decisions and application processes 
for high school.  Further, as the policy continues, popular knowledge of the relative difficulty of 
SEHS acceptance for a student from a Tier 3 or 4 neighborhood (with virtually or near perfect 
admissions scores required at the top Selective Enrollment High Schools) may discourage 
application to the SEHS program altogether.  Tier status may affect the likelihood of a student 
applying to, and thus enrolling in, a Selective Enrollment High School: thus, if there is 
quantifiable a behavioral effect of the new policy that influences application, pre- and post-
policy application rates per tier11 must be included in the regression to determine if the SEHS 
demographic proportions are affected by changes in applicant behavior.  These data were not 
included in the analysis for two reasons: one, it is not publicly available; and two, preparing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Application rates per tier would be considered for the regression model over racial/ethnic group application trends 
because the neighborhood tier assignment determines effective score cutoffs.  Thus, tier ranking—not race—could 
have an encouraging or discouraging effect on application rates, depending upon whether the tier is low or high.  
Utilizing application rates per racial/ethnic group would less effectively capture the true effect of the SES 
admissions policy on applicant behavior, but may alternately be considered as a control.   
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data for inclusion in the regression model would add immense complexity.12  However, the most 




















 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Including tier-factored trends into the regression would require retroactive tier assignment, based on the 
socioeconomic tier calculation outlined in Chapter 2, to all census tracts pre-SES admissions policy implementation 
to provide a baseline tier application rate. 
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Chapter 4. Results 
 This chapter is organized in two sections: descriptive statistics and regression analysis.  
The first section summarizes data on the sample, giving the means and standard deviations of 
Grade 9 racial/ethnic demographic proportions within the Selective Enrollment High Schools 
and CPS.  The second section examines the regression models applied to quantify the effect of 
the socioeconomic status-based admissions policy on racial/ethnic group enrollment.  Two 
regression models are presented and interpreted: the first measures treatment effect controlling 
for time trends, and the second measures treatment effect controlling for both time trends and 
CPS system demographic enrollment trends.  The latter regression model suggests that the SES 
admissions policy has a significant negative effect on Black and minority SEHS enrollment.   
Descriptive Statistics 
Ratio level data on enrollment counts and proportions within the Chicago Public Schools 
and Selective Enrollment High Schools was collected to inform the examined relationship 
between the new SES admissions policy and demographic enrollment.  Table 1 on the following 
page presents mean characteristics for the SEHS sample (N = 56) of demographic enrollment 
proportions and CPS sample of demographic enrollment proportions over Fall 2006-2013 
(excluding Fall 2010).  Means and standard deviations of enrollment proportions under each 
admissions policy are also given in order to establish variation in proportion, and a simple t-test 
to measure the difference between pre- and post-policy enrollment.  More detailed source data 
(counts for Grade 9 demographic enrollment from Fall 2006-2013) on SEHS and CPS 
enrollment are given in Appendices C and D respectively.  Appendix E gives figures displaying 
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annual Grade 9 demographic enrollment trends at each Selective Enrollment High School, as 
they vary considerably.13 
Sight analysis of the SEHS mean differences between racial/ethnic group proportions 
under the two admissions policies indicates a slight variation in enrollment, although no changes 
are significant.  (However, there are significant changes in CPS Grade 9 demographic enrollment 
proportions over time.)  Regression analysis of the socioeconomic status-based policy treatment 
is used to determine whether or not variation in SEHS enrollment is explained by the effect of 















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 This variability motivated the inclusion of the school effect dummy variable, σs, in the regression models. 
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics: SEHS and CPS Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions 
   Admissions Standard 	  	  
Variable Full sample Quota SES p 
SEHS Grade 9 Enrollment:    
 White 0.2034 0.2047 0.2016 0.9421 
 (0.1544) (0.1533) (0.1593) 
 
    
 Black 0.4255 0.4400 0.4061 0.7093 
 (0.3329) (0.3364) (0.3343) 
 
    
 Hispanic 0.2313 0.2164 0.2512 0.2760 
 (0.1173) (0.1138) (0.1214) 
 
    
 Asian 0.1022 0.1176 0.0818 0.1437 
 (0.0903) (0.1054) (0.0614) 
 
    
 Minority 0.7966 0.7953 0.7983 0.9421 
 (0.1544) (0.1533) (0.1593) 
 
    
 CPS Grade 9 Enrollment:    
 White 0.0751 0.0758 0.0743 0.0002 
 (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
 
    
 Black 0.4784 0.5073 0.4400 0.0000 
 (0.0356) (0.0146) (0.0065) 
 
    
 Hispanic 0.3959 0.3715 0.4283 0.0000 
 (0.0327) (0.0211) (0.0059) 
 
    
 Asian 0.0324 0.0308 0.0347 0.0000 
 (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0011) 
 
    
 Minority 0.9067 0.9095 0.9030 0.0145 
 (0.0010) (0.0125) (0.0011) 
 
    
 N 56 32 24 - 
Note. Standard deviations are given in parenthesis below the means. Full sample includes Fall 2006-2013 
enrollment proportions, excluding Fall 2010 proportions. CPS Grade 9 enrollment proportions necessarily 
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Regression Analysis: SES Policy Effect on Racial/Ethnic Group Enrollment Proportions 
 The first model presented captures the effect of the socioeconomic status-based 
admissions policy on enrollment proportions for a given demographic group (White, Black, 
Hispanic, Asian and Minority), with the predicted outcome proportion Y controlled by time 
trends, which are included in the model globally (CPS-level trends) and at an individual school 
level.  Table 2 presents the results of this analysis for each coded demographic outcome 
proportion, where panel A estimates treatment effect given a global time trend (equation 4) and 
panel B estimates effect given school-specific time trends (equation 5).  The second multivariate 
regression model introduces control for each demographic CPS Grade 9 enrollment cohort over 
the examined time period.  Table 3 presents the results from estimations of equation 6 (also 
including global time trends) on outcome proportion Y for each demographic.  Comparing the 
similar results of the two regression models, it is evident that controlling for the linear CPS 
Grade 9 enrollment trends indicates that the SES-effect predictions are robust to system-wide 
demographic variations.  Thus, forthcoming discussion on the empirical results will focus on the 
second, more robust regression model (presented in Table 3). 
The regression model suggests that the socioeconomic admissions policy, when 
compared to the baseline quota standard, has significantly impacted levels of Black and minority 
student enrollment in the SEHS program.  The average effect of the policy on Black enrollment 
proportions is -0.058 (significant at p = 0.05), meaning that the SES policy decreases Black 
enrollment in Selective Enrollment High Schools by nearly 5.8%.  Minority (excluding non-
Hispanic White) enrollment was also significantly impacted (p = 0.10) by the policy, as the 
average decrease in enrollment proportion as a result of the new policy reaches roughly 7%.   
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TABLE 2. Impact of SES Policy on Demographic Enrollment Proportions 
  Proportion Enrollment  
 White Black Hispanic Asian Minority 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Global Time Trend 
     Treatment 0.0353 -0.0617 0.0114 -0.0427 -0.0353 
 (0.0315) (0.0324)* (0.0236) (0.0329) (0.0315) 
      
Year -0.0085 0.0062 0.0052 0.0015 0.0085 
 (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0064) 
            
B. School-Level Time Trend      
Treatment 0.0353 -0.0617 0.0114 -0.0427 -0.0353 
 (0.0342) (0.0352) (0.0256) (0.0357) (0.0342) 
      
Brooks - Trend -0.0068 0.0127 -0.0039 0.0077 0.0068 
 (0.0063) (0.0065)* (0.0047) (0.0066) (0.0063) 
      
Jones - Trend -0.0080 0.0073 0.0008 -0.0020 0.0080 
 (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0047) (0.0066) (0.0063) 
      
King - Trend -0.0085 0.0106 0.0011 0.0074 0.0085 
 (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0047) (0.0066) (0.0063) 
      
Lane - Trend -0.0082 0.0043 0.0050 0.0027 0.0082 
 (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0047) (0.0066) (0.0063) 
      
Lindblom - Trend -0.0087 -0.0075 0.0154 0.0105 0.0087 
 (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0047)** (0.0066) (0.0063) 
      
Northside - Trend -0.0099 0.0214 0.0073 -0.0179 0.0099 
 (0.0063) (0.0065)** (0.0047) (0.0066)** (0.0063) 
      
Payton - Trend -0.0118 0.0030 0.0031 -0.0001 0.0118 
 (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0047) (0.0066) (0.0063) 
      
Young - Trend -0.0062 -0.0026 0.0127 0.0040 0.0062 
 (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0047)** (0.0066) (0.0063) 
      
Include Grade 9 demographic 
enrollment controls No No No No No 
Outcome mean enrollment 
proportion (baseline): 0.2047 0.4400 0.2164 0.1176 0.7953 
N 56 56 56 56 56 
R2 0.9716 0.9922 0.9633 0.9373 0.9716 
            
Note.  Models are estimated with a robust ordinary least squares regression, accounting for demographic enrollment clustering effects 
within each school over time (reflected in given standard errors). Predictions of enrollment proportions are given based on historical 
demographic 9th-grade Selective Enrollment data over time, pre- and post-SES admissions policy implementation (treatment), 
controlling for time trends. Time trends are controlled utilizing either a global (CPS) trend variable or school-specific time trend 
variables, and both regressions are given (models A and B respectively). All models also include school fixed effects. Given baseline 
means reflect mean SEHS demographic enrollment pre-treatment. Reported R2 values reflect regression models given school-level time 
trends. Standard errors appear in parenthesis below the beta coefficients; significance of standard errors is indicated: * = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p 
≤ 0.05. 
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TABLE 3. Impact of SES Policy on Demographic Enrollment Proportions, Controlling for 
CPS Enrollment Trends 
  Proportion Enrollment  
 White Black Hispanic Asian Minority 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
A. Global Time Trend 
     Treatment 0.0458 -0.0579 0.0173 -0.0427 -0.0703 
 (0.0335) (0.0246)** (0.0189) (0.0332) (0.0375)* 
      
Year -0.0098 0.0079 -0.0027 0.0021 0.0148 
 (0.0066) (0.0126) (0.0096) (0.0040) (0.0075)* 
            
B. School-Level Time Trend      
Treatment 0.0458 -0.0579 0.0173 -0.0427 -0.0703 
 (0.0364) (0.0268)* (0.0206) (0.0361) (0.0408) 
      
Brooks - Trend -0.0080 0.0145 -0.0118 0.0083 0.0130 
 (0.0065) (0.0135) (0.0113) (0.0061) (0.0075) 
      
Jones - Trend -0.0092 0.0091 -0.0071 -0.0014 0.0142 
 (0.0065) (0.0135) (0.0113) (0.0061) (0.0075)* 
      
King - Trend -0.0098 0.0124 -0.0068 0.0079 0.0148 
 (0.0065) (0.0135) (0.0113) (0.0061) (0.0075)* 
      
Lane - Trend -0.0095 0.0061 -0.0029 0.0033 0.0145 
 -0.0065 (0.0135) (0.0113) (0.0061) (0.0075)* 
      
Lindblom - Trend -0.0099 -0.0057 0.0075 0.0111 0.0150 
 (0.0065) (0.0135) (0.0113) (0.0061) (0.0075)* 
      
Northside - Trend -0.0111 0.0232 -0.0006 -0.0173 0.0161 
 (0.0065) (0.0135) (0.0113) (0.0061)** (0.0075)* 
      
Payton - Trend -0.0131 0.0048 -0.0048 0.0005 0.0181 
 (0.0065)* (0.0135) (0.0113) (0.0061) (0.0075)** 
      
Young - Trend -0.0075 -0.0008 0.0049 0.0046 0.0125 
 (0.0065) (0.0135) (0.0113) (0.0061) (0.0075) 
      
Include Grade 9 demographic 
enrollment controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Outcome mean enrollment 
proportion (baseline): 0.2047 0.4400 0.2164 0.1176 0.7953 
N 56 56 56 56 56 
R2 0.9724 0.9922 0.9639 0.9374 0.9740 
            
Note.  Models are estimated with a robust ordinary least squares regression, accounting for demographic enrollment clustering effects 
within each school over time (reflected in given standard errors). Predictions of enrollment proportions are given based on historical 
demographic 9th-grade Selective Enrollment data over time, pre- and post-SES admissions policy implementation (treatment), 
controlling for time trends and changes in overall 9th-grade CPS matriculation demographics. Time trends are controlled utilizing either 
a global (CPS) time trend variable or or school-specific time trend variables, and both regressions are given (models A and B 
respectively). All models also include school fixed effects. Given baseline means reflect mean SEHS demographic enrollment pre-
treatment. Reported R2 values reflect regression models given school-level time trends. Standard errors appear in parenthesis below the 
beta coefficients; significance of standard errors is indicated: * = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05. 
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Approaching statistical significance, the regression model also demonstrates treatment effects on 
White and Asian enrollment proportions: where a 4.6% positive SES policy treatment effect on 
White enrollment proportions is observed, versus a 4.3% negative treatment effect on Asian 
enrollment proportions.  The model predicts no significant effect on Hispanic enrollment as a 
result of the new SES policy.14  Taken together, these findings indicate that the socioeconomic 
status-based admissions policy has harmed minority enrollment proportions, placing particular 
burden on Black students.  Appendix F summarizes the policy effect for each demographic group 
given this regression model.   
These results generally support the findings of earlier researchers, who have asserted that 
socioeconomic status-based admissions policies tend to favor White applicants (Carnevale & 
Rose, 2004; Kane, 1998; Koertz, et al., 2002; Sander, 1998; Slater, 1995).  However, all previous 
studies examined postsecondary enrollment effects, sourcing data from large universities, 
university systems, or groups of universities.  Thus, my findings provide the first perspective on 
the enrollment effects of a socioeconomic status-based high school admissions policy, as 
Chicago’s was the first SES-based high school admissions procedure to be implemented in a 
selective high school program.  While this scale and sample size makes my results less 
generalizable, ultimately, the results confirm that SES-based affirmative action policies result in 
lower minority enrollment relative to racial affirmative action policies.   
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Preliminary qualitative justification for this assertion suggests that this policy does not harm Hispanic enrollment, 
and may actually increase it (see the beta coefficient), because one of the tier determinants considered is percentile 
English-speaking, which would almost exclusively benefit tiers with high proportions of Hispanic residents.  This 
conclusion could indicate the relative effectiveness of operative race-conscious SES criteria at maintaining or 
improving minority representation.  
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Chapter 5. Findings and Conclusions 
 This thesis provides the first empirical evidence of the effect of socioeconomic status-
based admissions policies on selection-based high school enrollment outcomes.  In my analysis 
of the Chicago Public Schools’ Selective Enrollment High School admissions policies and 
enrollment trends, my findings show that SES-based admissions policies result in decreased 
enrollment for minority and Black students.  Thus, my primary research question—whether or 
not the CPS SES-based admissions policy would provide comparable levels of diversity when 
held against the demographic enrollment outcomes ensured by quota systems—was answered, 
concluding that the SES-based admissions policy was not effective at matching quota level 
diversity, and actually produced a significant drop in minority and Black enrollment proportions.   
Alternative Hypothesis: Non-Linear Urban Population Trends 
 Although CPS system-wide enrollment trends were accounted for within the final 
regression model, the shifting demographics of Chicago could actually have a larger impact on 
the enrollment proportions than predicted in the model (by coefficient ρt).  The strongest 
alternate hypothesis states that minority enrollment outcomes observed under the SES-based 
admissions standard are actually explained by non-linear urban demographic trends; specifically, 
Black flight.  The regression model presented assumes that CPS enrollment population trends, 
and Chicago demographic trends, are linear: however, if a longer time horizon is examined, these 
population trends may exhibit non-linear properties.  From 2000-2010, the Chicago population 
fell by over 200,000 residents.  Black residents accounted for more than 178,000, or 89%, of this 
total (Keen, 2011).  Inspired by the same factors that spurred some upper-middle class Black 
flight in the late-twentieth century—pervasive poverty, unemployment, crime and violence—this 
trend reemerging as one of the most important urban demographic phenomena: over half of the 
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nation’s Black population live in the suburbs—up from 43% in 2000 (The changing colour, 
2011; Wolman, 1976).  
As Black families leave the city core, fewer Black students enroll in the CPS—a trend 
illustrated in this study’s data.  However, the analysis presumes that this trend is linear; based on 
the linear relationship observed, there is no treatment effect of the changing proportion of Black 
CPS enrollment on the proportion of Black students enrolled in Selective Enrollment High 
Schools.  Where these enrollment and urban population trends are non-linear, both the 
significance and magnitude of the SES policy treatment effect on Black enrollment would 
decrease where these trends are negative, which could render an SES treatment effect near 0 
where these population trends are most pronounced.  In turn, as the negative modeled minority 
enrollment treatment effect is largely driven by Black enrollment proportion changes, this could 
indicate the affected decrease in Black and minority enrollment outcomes from the new SES-
based policy are explained by overall urban population trends, rather than Selective Enrollment 
admissions policies (which could further imply that the policy is decidedly effective at 
maintaining quota-levels of racial diversity).  Without more extensive information on Black 
population trends in Chicago, including future data points, it would be difficult to establish a 
non-linear population trend even where one exists.  This alternative hypothesis, however, is 
unlikely, as it assumes that the non-linear changes in enrollment occur concurrently with policy 
implementation—and the observed flight has occurred since the turn of the century.  Given 
current information and models, it is still apparent that the SES-based admissions policy results 
in lower levels of Black and minority enrollment.   
 
 
RACE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND REPRESENTATION: REDEFINING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CHICAGO 50 
Implications  
 Analysis indicates that the current CPS socioeconomic status-based policy will produce 
significant, albeit minimal, decreases in Black (5.8%) and minority (7%) demographic 
enrollment within Selective Enrollment High Schools.  Additionally, decreases in Asian 
enrollment (4.3%) and increases in White enrollment (4.6%) approach significance.  Thus, the 
policy neither improves nor maintains minority or minority group representation compared to a 
race-based affirmative action policy, like a quota system.  However, despite the marginal 
predicted changes in enrollment proportions, the policy still works to maintain a critical mass of 
minority students.   
It is unlikely that a race-neutral affirmative action policy will ever be able to produce 
equivalent levels of racial diversity within programs and schools compared to a racial affirmative 
action.  Conversely, it is more important to note that the socioeconomic status-based admissions 
policy prescribed by Chicago Public Schools’ Admissions Policy for Magnet, Selective 
Enrollment and Other Options For Knowledge Schools and Programs is still a valid diversity 
maintenance tool.  Although it does result in decreased Black and minority enrollment when 
compared to the vacated racial quota system, compared at face value to other race-neutral 
admissions policies—like the merit-based (race-blind) admissions policy practiced by New York 
City’s Specialized High Schools or the simpler SES-based policy tested by the UCLA School of 
Law—minority enrollment and representation is much higher in the CPS.  The meritocratic 
system, employed by perhaps the most operationally comparable school system in the country 
(the NYC Specialized High Schools), gave only 12% of admissions offers to Black and Hispanic 
students combined in 2013, while these students comprise over 70% of the city’s public school 
students (Cramer, 2013).  In New York, however, there was never any affirmative action.  At 
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UCLA, where the new policy can be benchmarked against pre-Proposition 209 (1996) 
admissions data, the SES-policy produced a class with 73.2% fewer Black students, compared to 
affirmative action enrollment data from 1990-1996 (Sander, 1998).  In the Chicago Public 
Schools, the statistically significant decreases in Black and minority enrollment proportions 
observed are considerably less severe.  The CPS policy was well designed and specific, taking 
care to account for minority demographic groups (particularly, Black and Hispanic) with targeted 
race-neutral variables, which have allowed the policy to escape much of the White bias seen in 
most SES-based affirmative action.  Thus, although the CPS policy is decidedly less effective at 
producing high levels racial diversity than a quota system, it is one of the strongest alternatives 
to racial affirmative action policies available.  Ultimately, my conclusions indicate that a 
socioeconomic status-based tiered affirmative action policy can deliver acceptable, and perhaps 
one day equitable, levels of minority group representation within schools.   
Nonetheless, this recommendation is limited.  While the socioeconomic status-based 
policy is fairly (given the small effect size) successful at provisioning racial diversity within 
Chicago Public Schools, a similarly designed tier system may be difficult to implement, to 
efficient outcomes, in public school districts nationwide or to institutions of higher learning.  The 
effectiveness of the SES-based is necessarily rooted in the selected tier factors, which group the 
student applicant cohorts into four socioeconomic tiers.  These factors were selected specifically 
for the Chicago model, and thus presume that there is some correlation between race, SES and 
neighborhood based upon: income, home ownership, single-parent household proportion, percent 
non-English speaking, adult education levels and local school quality.  Preliminary research 
indicates that Chicago’s urban residential neighborhoods are uniquely segregated along both 
racial and socioeconomic lines (Orfield, Kucsera, & Siegel-Hawley, 2012).  In public school 
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districts where the same demographic patterns do not exist, the new CPS admissions policy may 
prove ineffectual.  For universities, assigning statewide or national tiers introduces a host of new 
challenges, complexities and limitations.  However, the CPS policy is still particularly important, 
as it indicates that it is possible to use race-neutral methods to achieve an undisputed critical 
mass of minority students.  As a result, policymakers pursuing alternatives to racial affirmative 
action can use the CPS Selective Enrollment tier system as a basis for their own race-neutral, 
constitutional affirmative action policies, taking into account residential patterns where a 
neighborhood-based tier system is considered.   
In order to design the most effective race-neutral affirmative action policy based upon 
socioeconomic status, the correlation between SES tier and race must be understood.  Future 
research in the area of community-factored, socioeconomic status-based affirmative action 
should include extensive correlation analysis between neighborhood socioeconomic status and 
race—including the identification of new predictive factors to include in a tier formula, outside 
of the six utilized by the CPS—which would not only be instrumental in designing better race-
neutral affirmative action policies, but also improve our understanding of the components of 
modern racial minority disadvantage.  And where this marked disadvantage exists, it is the role 
of policy to work to ameliorate these issues.   
It is indefensible to wholly dismiss affirmative action without demonstrating equality of 
educational opportunity for any minority or disadvantaged groups.  However, despite stagnating, 
pervasive segregation and a persistent achievement gap, policy progress has led many schools, 
institutions, and even states away from any racial consideration in admissions procedure—while 
offering few alternatives.  The CPS Selective Enrollment High Schools’ admissions policy is a 
socially valuable tool, illustrating policy innovation in affirmative action by capturing and 
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protecting disadvantage without consideration of race.  Forward, given the eroding 
constitutionality of racial affirmative action, such policies may be the only means to achieve 
diversity within public schools and institutions.  Independent of any court decisions or school 
policies, protecting equality of access for all students is a key challenge for modern education 
and civil rights.  Thus, the exploration of innovative, equitable admissions and affirmative action 
policies—like the CPS policy—will ensure equal opportunity for minority students into the 
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Appendix A. CPS Demographic Enrollment Trends, 1950-2010 (Select Years) 
Year Percentage of Enrollment     
  
White Black Hispanic 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander 
  Total 
Enrollment (est.) 
1950 62 36 - 0  372,000 
1960 55 42 - 0  480,000 
1970 35 55 1 1  578,000 
1978 22 61 16 2  495,000 
1981 17 61 20 2  443,000 
1987 14 60 23 3  429,000 
1998 10 53 33 3  431,000 
2000 10 53 34 3  432,000 
2005 8 49 38 3  421,000 
2010 9 43 44 3  403,000 
              
Note. Table data compiled from Chicago Public Schools data (2014) and data published in Society and 
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Appendix B. Public School Racial Dissimilarity Index (Select Cities), 2009-2010 
  Dissimilarity Index 











New York-Newark-Edison, NY-NJ-PA 0.78 0.56 0.70 0.71 0.49 0.61 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 0.68 0.52 0.69 0.68 0.55 0.62 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 0.79 0.47 0.65 0.80 0.69 0.65 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 0.58 0.47 0.58 0.55 0.43 0.60 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 0.62 0.50 0.60 0.54 0.41 0.59 
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Appendix C. Selective Enrollment High School Demographic Counts (Grade 9), 2006-2013 
  Racial/Ethnic Group   





Brooks      
2006-2007 0 169 34 1 205 
2007-2008 1 173 22 1 200 
2008-2009 5 175 18 1 199 
2009-2010 2 170 27 0 199 
2010-2011° 1 162 32 0 198 
2011-2012 3 168 18 1 192 
2012-2013 0 147 22 0 173 
2013-2014 1 167 26 1 196 
      Jones      
2006-2007 54 37 55 29 183 
2007-2008 52 39 59 26 192 
2008-2009 67 60 72 25 224 
2009-2010 66 65 65 39 235 
2010-2011° 59 51 58 21 197 
2011-2012 56 46 60 25 200 
2012-2013 63 41 81 12 217 
2013-2014 116 80 125 42 427 
      King      
2006-2007 4 228 9 6 249 
2007-2008 3 204 4 2 218 
2008-2009 4 237 6 3 250 
2009-2010 2 235 5 1 243 
2010-2011° 4 202 16 4 228 
2011-2012 1 204 10 1 220 
2012-2013 2 192 11 8 218 
2013-2014 0 142 6 0 148 
      Lane      
2006-2007 318 125 424 155 1095 
2007-2008 293 172 459 154 1131 
2008-2009 328 125 503 166 1122 
2009-2010 344 117 475 113 1050 
2010-2011° 323 83 513 121 1066 
2011-2012 358 116 573 132 1204 
2012-2013 213 63 382 79 819 




RACE, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND REPRESENTATION: REDEFINING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN CHICAGO 62 
  Racial/Ethnic Group   





Lindblom      
2006-2007 6 115 28 1 150 
2007-2008 3 201 48 5 260 
2008-2009 8 143 44 2 197 
2009-2010 0 129 49 1 179 
2010-2011° 4 171 66 2 246 
2011-2012 4 148 64 3 220 
2012-2013 4 165 80 8 260 
2013-2014 4 151 64 6 227 
      Northside      
2006-2007 94 9 54 78 248 
2007-2008 112 9 68 94 309 
2008-2009 99 10 62 86 258 
2009-2010 103 17 54 90 264 
2010-2011° 124 29 54 56 268 
2011-2012 125 19 72 46 274 
2012-2013 97 32 72 48 270 
2013-2014 83 21 75 48 266 
      Payton      
2006-2007 68 33 27 23 165 
2007-2008 91 41 55 46 259 
2008-2009 71 82 50 32 235 
2009-2010 77 83 71 25 256 
2010-2011° 65 36 31 13 156 
2011-2012 97 46 56 20 251 
2012-2013 86 40 43 29 205 
2013-2014 60 37 54 21 233 
      Young      
2006-2007 158 155 108 72 493 
2007-2008 154 177 112 75 546 
2008-2009 141 175 95 91 502 
2009-2010 143 141 97 122 503 
2010-2011° 132 103 132 53 439 
2011-2012 146 142 136 64 512 
2012-2013 156 132 160 68 536 
2013-2014 147 109 136 67 468 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note.  Enrollment data for Native American (NA) and Multiracial (MR) students are not listed due to inconsistent 
reporting of counts over the evaluated time period; however, total enrollment counts reflect the total class size 
(including NA and MR). °Enrollment data from the 2010-2011 school year is omitted from analysis because it was a 
result of the pilot SES program, which was amended thereafter.  
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Appendix D. CPS Demographic Counts (Grade 9), 2006-2013 
  Racial/Ethnic Group   





2006-2007 2,832 19,742 13,006 1,044 37,514 
2007-2008 2,622 17,761 12,600 1,135 35,151 
2008-2009 2,577 17,532 13,001 1,070 34,233 
2009-2010 2,572 15,963 13,183 1,097 32,877 
2010-2011° 2,279 14,171 13,135 996 31,081 
2011-2012 2,319 13,494 12,811 1,067 30,336 
2012-2013 2,176 13,249 12,719 972 29,812 
2013-2014 2,231 12,945 13,098 1,037 30,069 
            
Note.  Enrollment data for Native American (NA) and Multiracial (MR) students are not listed due to inconsistent 
reporting of counts over the evaluated time period; however, total enrollment counts reflect the total class size 
(including NA and MR). °Enrollment data from the 2010-2011 school year is omitted from analysis because it was a 
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Appendix E. Selective Enrollment High School Demographic Grade 9 Proportion Trends,  
2007-2014  
 
Figure 1. Demographic Grade 9 Enrollment Proportions, Gwendolyn Brooks College 
Preparatory Academy High School 
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Appendix F. Treatment Effect of SES Policy on Demographic Group Enrollment 
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